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ABSTRACT: Drawing on the case of France during the 2017 presidential election, which was marked by the 
victory of the centrist Emmanuel Macron and the surge of the populist radical right (Marine Le Pen) and 
left (Jean-Luc Mélenchon), this paper analyses the impact of social insecurity on voting, using a multidi-
mensional indicator of “precariousness” that combines measures of economic hardship and social and cul-
tural isolation. On the basis of the 2017 French Election Study, a series of logistic regressions estimate the 
impact of precariousness on individual vote choice (including abstention) in both rounds, controlling for 
socio-demographic and attitudinal variables. Precariousness mainly has a strong negative impact on turn-
out, silencing the most deprived. Among those who vote, it has a strong negative impact on support for 
Emmanuel Macron. It also has a positive impact on support for the populist radical right and, to a lesser 
extent, on support for the populist radical left when controlling for socio-demographic variables. But this 
effect practically disappears after controlling for attitudes. Social insecurity does not necessarily breed 
populism. Ideological divisions make the difference, especially attitudes towards the European Union, im-
migration, and the left-right divide.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The two oil shocks of the mid 1970s put an end to the “Thirty Glorious Years” of 
economic growth that followed World War Two, and marked what the French sociolo-
gist Robert Castel called “the return of social insecurity” (Castel 1995, 2003, 2005; Cas-
tel and Martin 2012).  In sharp contrast with the wage-earning society, where workers 
had stable jobs, guaranteed wages, and good social protection, the aftermath of the oil 
shock brought social disaffection, mass unemployment, labour market dualization 
(Haüsermann and Schwander 2012), exploding income inequalities (OECD 2008, 2011 
and 2017), and new forms of poverty. The “Great recession” of 2008 exacerbated these 
trends. A burgeoning literature sees a causal link between crisis-driven economic inse-
curity and the wave of populism that is sweeping through Europe, both on the right 
and, more recently, on the left (Bermeo and Bartels 2014; Kriesi and Pappas 2015; In-
glehart and Norris 2017; Algan, Guriev, Papaioannou and Passari 2017; Alvaredo, Chan-
cel, Piketty, Saez and Zucman. 2018; Piketty 2018).  
France is an ideal case to test this hypothesis. Economic insecurity has increased 
since 2008 according to several indicators, less so than in Southern Europe, but more 
so than in most Northern countries. Unemployment rates, which had been slowly de-
clining, increased in the wake of the Great Recession, from 8% in 2007 to 10.4% in 
2015, and remained at 9.4 % in 2017. These rates were well below those of Greece and 
Spain (21.5% and 17.2%), but almost 2 points above the EU-28 average (7.6%) and 5 
points above the German and UK rates (3.8% and 4.4%) (Eurostat 2018). Atypical forms 
of employment (such as part-time, temporary, and fixed-term contracts) grew from 
12.5% in 2002 to 15.8% in 2018, bringing French rates close to the European average 
(Rhein and Walwei 2018). Poverty rates remained lower in France than in the EU, but 
they increased from 13.2% in 2008 to 14.6% in 2011, and were still at 14% in 20171. 
Meanwhile, persistent poverty (over three years) increased from 5.1% in 2009 to 6.7% 
in 2015 according to the National Observatory of Poverty and Social Exclusion (ONPES 
2018).  
 
1
 Monetary poverty threshold set at 60 % of the national median disposable income after social transfers.  
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As for populism, the French Front National2, co-founded by Jean-Marie le Pen in 
1972, is the oldest and most successful among the radical right parties that arose in Eu-
rope in the mid-1980s. Since his youngest daughter, Marine Le Pen, took over in 2011 
and started a campaign of “de-demonization” (dédiabolisation) (Dézé 2015), her elec-
toral success has been spectacular. She came first, ahead of the Socialist left and the 
Sarkozyist right, in the European Parliament elections of 2014, while the 2017 French 
presidential election magnified the populist trends affecting other established democ-
racies: the collapse of mainstream parties, the electoral dynamism of extremes, and 
the surprise victory of a newcomer – Emmanuel Macron, founder of the new move-
ment En marche! The candidates of the centre-left Socialist party and the centre-right 
Les Républicains combined garnered barely more than a quarter of votes in the first 
round. The leader of La France insoumise (France unbowed), Jean-Luc Mélenchon, se-
cured 19.6% of the votes, and the Front National candidate Marine Le Pen received 
21.3%, qualifying her for the second round. Although Emmanuel Macron beat her, she 
obtained a record 34% vote share, representing 10.6 million voters.   
This paper makes a threefold contribution to the debate. It proposes a new multidi-
mensional indicator of precariousness, in line with the “capability approach” to wellbe-
ing (Sen 1985; Nussbaum and Sen 1993), taking into account employment, job type, 
and monetary poverty, as well as health, housing, and access to social and cultural life. 
It revisits the sociology of political participation and citizenship, focusing on citizens at 
the bottom of the social ladder who are seldom studied per se in electoral surveys. It 
also questions the often-assumed link between social insecurity and support for popu-
list radical right parties, showing that the most precarious are the less likely to vote. An 
introductory section presents the theoretical and methodological approaches, while 
the second explores the relationship between social insecurity and electoral turnout. 
The third examines the relationship between social insecurity and vote choice.  A con-
cluding section proposes further avenues for research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 Renamed “Rassemblement National” (National Rally) in June 2018.  
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2. State of the art, hypotheses and methodology 
  
2.1 Socioeconomic position and politics 
  
A first approach in this vein is the political economy of voting within a rational choice 
perspective inspired by Anthony Downs’ ‘median voter’ theory (1957). The classical 
model of Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard (1981) implies that rising inequalities increase 
preference for redistribution. The lower the median voter’s income falls below the 
mean income, the more likely s/he would benefit from tax transfers and thus support 
the more redistributive parties of the Left. It is a very simplified model. But recent stud-
ies that account for institutional context (tax system, type of welfare state, unionisa-
tion) and party competition come to the same conclusion (Cusack, Iversen and Rehm 
2008; Pontusson and Rueda 2008). The same rational choice perspective leads other 
authors to emphasize the logic of economic voting, and more specifically retrospective 
voting. They argue that in hard times voters primarily tend to punish or reward incum-
bents according to their economic performance, whatever the ideology of the party in 
office (Healy and Malhotra 2013; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Bélanger 2013; Dassonne-
ville and Lewis-Beck 2014). Recent studies on the impact of the Great Recession come 
to the same conclusion (Bartels 2014; Kriesi 2014). Another strand of literature takes 
into account the observed or perceived risk of precariousness and its impact on welfare 
preferences. Philippe Rehm (2016; Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger 2012) adopts what 
he calls a revisionist approach to the “power resource school”, showing that two dis-
tinct groups tend to support the welfare state: the most disadvantaged (low-income) 
as well as the most economically insecure (high-risk), regardless of social class. The two 
indicators are correlated, but do not coincide completely. The “doubly deprived” (low-
income, high-risk) are the most supportive of the welfare state, while the “doubly ad-
vantaged” (high-income, low-risk) are the least supportive. But the two other groups 
are cross-pressured. That is, high-risk but well off citizens can in certain circumstances 
find it to be in their interest to back welfare spending, while low-income, low-risk peo-
ple might turn against it.  
A second burgeoning field of research links the electoral dynamics of Populist Radi-
cal Right parties in Europe since the 1990s (Mudde 2007) to the realignment of the 
low-income and working-class voters that used to form the stronghold of the left 
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(Oesch 2008 and 2012; Arzheimer 2012). The transition from the industrial to the ‘post-
industrial’ era has made societies more fluid and atomized, weakened old class solidari-
ties and party loyalties, and favoured the ‘politics of resentment’ and ‘anti-politics’ 
which proved fertile ground for the emergence of these parties (Betz 1994, 36-37). The 
process is aptly described by the sociologist Didier Eribon in his autobiography Retour à 
Reims (2009) where he recounts how his parents and grandparents, once typical Com-
munist party supporters, turned to the Front national. The second phase came with the 
acceleration of economic and financial globalization.  The so-called “losers of globaliza-
tion” turned to these Populist Radical Right parties – workers fearful of competition 
from immigrants and low-paid labour in developing countries (Betz 1994; Kriesi, 
Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey 2008; Bornschier and Kriesi 2012; Gougou 
and Roux 2013). Then the Great Recession of 2008 kindled their fears and reinforced 
their realignment (Betz 2015; Mayer 2014). However, some authors warn against a 
simplistic view of the process, arguing that it is more often the “cultural” losers rather 
than those worse-off in purely economic terms who turn to these parties, feeling their 
identity is threatened. Meanwhile, the most disadvantaged – the real “economic los-
ers’ – are more likely not to vote at all (Bornschier and Kriesi 2012, 26). More recent 
research has focused on populist radical lefts, such as Podemos and Syriza, and their 
appeal to working-class voters (Rooduijn, Burgoon, van Elsas and van de Werfhost 
2017; Lubbers and Scheepers 2007; Visser, Lubbers, Kraaykamp and Jaspers 2014). The 
large-scale study conducted by Rooduijn and his colleagues, based on seven waves of 
the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 to 2014 in 23 countries, convincingly 
shows that there are similarities between the voters of the 26 radical right and 23 radi-
cal left parties studied (2017). Both are overrepresented among voters of lower socio-
economic status and amongst working class voters. They also share anti-elite, anti-
European and anti-neoliberalism and austerity positions. Yet they diverge radically on 
the issues of solidarity and immigration. Education is the main factor explaining this 
ideological contrast. The more educated turn to the radical left, and the less educated 
to the radical right.    
A third line of research is political participation. From the pioneering work of Sidney 
Verba and Norman Nie (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schloz-
man and Brady 1995), to the most recent cross-national surveys (Gallego, 2008; Solt, 
2008 and 2010; Schäfer 2013; Offe 2013), a host of studies show that participation 
skews in favour of higher status groups in society: those who have the necessary re-
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sources, education, money, skills, network, and attendant participatory attitudes (in-
terest, trust, and sense of efficacy). Conversely, the absence of such resources is con-
ducive to abstention and political disaffection. Studies focusing on people in extreme 
situations such as the unemployed (Lazarsfeld, Jahoda and Zeisel 2002 [1933]; Pierru 
2003), recipients of minimum welfare income (Bègue 2007), and inhabitants of disad-
vantaged neighbourhoods (Braconnier and Dormagen 2007) confirm the demobilizing 
impact of social insecurity, as do recent studies on job market segmentation and the 
growing divide between protected “insiders” and “outsiders” at risk (Haüsermann and 
Schwander 2012; Rovny and Rovny 2017). Only rarely, in specific political and economic 
contexts, can unemployment and economic hardship fuel discontent and remobilize 
(Burden and Wichowski 2014).    
One can draw a series of hypotheses concerning the electoral impact of social inse-
curity in France in 2017 from this contrasting literature. It appears unlikely that precar-
iousness will benefit the mainstream left. On the eve of the presidential election, the 
outgoing socialist president François Hollande was so deeply unpopular, even in his 
own constituency, that he could not even run in his party’s primaries. The candidate 
who won the primaries, Benoit Hamon, was clearly further to the left than the rest of 
the Socialist party, especially on welfare issues, but was hardly known to the public. 
The mainstream right, Les Républicains, could have benefited from a negative vote 
against the incumbent party, but the candidate selected in the primaries, François Fil-
lon, rapidly saw his image tarnished by a succession of embezzlement charges; his rep-
utation as a hard-core conservative on social and economic issues did not help. General 
political distrust reached a climax. Four months before the election, only 11% of French 
voters said they trusted parties, 75% considered most politicians corrupt, and 89% had 
the feeling that “political leaders don’t care what people like us think” 3 - and this share 
was even higher among voters with low levels of income and education. This was the 
backdrop to political exit and support for populist, anti-system candidates, especially 
among the most disadvantaged, already more distant from politics and less likely to 
participate.  This leaves us with two main hypotheses:  
 
 
3
 Baromètre de la confiance du Cevipof, wave 8, 16-30 December 2016. Retrieved January 3, 2019 
(https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/BJ15515-CEVIPOF-
Barometre_confiance_en_politique_vague8-1.pdf). 
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 HI Social insecurity is likely to decrease turnout  
 H2 Social insecurity is likely to increase support for the Populist Radical Right 
and Left  
 
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
The data used to test these hypotheses come from a post-electoral survey of a large 
sample that is representative of registered voters living in metropolitan France. The 
survey was conducted immediately after the second round of the 2017 presidential 
election4. Operationalizing social insecurity required an indicator that went beyond 
material poverty to encompass social and cultural isolation, that is, an indicator of 
“précarité” – a word that is difficult to translate into English. It has several meanings in 
French, where it is used either as a synonym for social exclusion in general or as a lim-
ited reference to unstable forms of employment (for a history of the concept see Cin-
golani 2006). Here, the term is used in the perspective developed by the founder of 
ATD-Quart Monde (All Together in Dignity to Overcome Poverty – Fourth World) in his 
seminal report for the French Economic and Social Council (Wresinski 1987), and ex-
panded by the sociologist Robert Castel (1995, 2003, 2005), as a lack of basic securities: 
being “at the mercy of any vicissitude of life, an illness, an accident, a lull in work,  that 
interrupts the ordinary course of life and threatens to plunge us into social dependency 
and degradation” (Castel 2005,1). The EPICES index (Evaluation de la Précarité et des 
Inégalités de Santé pour les Centres d’Examen de Santé/Evaluation of Precariousness 
and Health Inequalities for Health Examination Centres) seemed the best fit. Originally 
developed for the French Social Security medical centres to detect health problems in 
socially vulnerable populations, the index is built using eleven simple yes/no questions 
covering financial difficulties, housing conditions, type of health insurance, support 
from family and friends, cultural activities, etc.5 The questions had already been tested 
 
4 
The 2017 French Election Study (FES 2017), coordinated by Nicolas Sauger at CEE, was conducted by Kan-
tar TNS, face to face, between May 8 and May 23, on a quota based (gender, age, education, occupation of 
household and political regions) national sample of 1830 registered voters (for a detailed presentation see 
Gougou and Sauger 2017).   
5
 The indicator stems from a large-scale survey conducted in 1998, with a host of socioeconomic indica-
tors. A correspondence analysis showed all items loaded on a first factor of precariousness. The 11 items 
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in several electoral surveys (Braconnier and Mayer 2015; Mayer 2017). They take little 
time, are easily understood, and the non-response rate is negligible (below 1%). The 
answers provide a continuous measure that allows for the placement of respondents 
on a scale of precariousness ranging from 0 (not precarious at all) to 100 (extremely 
precarious)6.  
 
EPICES Score questions 
 
1. Do you ever see a social worker? 
2. Do you have additional health insurance? 
3. Do you live with a partner? 
4. Do you own your house? 
5. Are there periods in the month when you have real financial difficulties 
meeting your needs (food, rent, electricity, etc.)? 
6. Have you exercised or played sports over the last 12 months? 
7. Did you go to the movies, theatre or any shows over the last 12 months? 
8. Have you had a vacation over the last 12 months?  
9. In the last 6 months, have you been in contact with family members other 
than your parents and children? 
10. In the event of an emergency, are there people nearby on whom you could 
count to host you for a few days if necessary? 
11. In the event of an emergency, are there people nearby on whom you could 
count to provide material assistance?  
 
 
Comparing advantaged voters in the lower quintile of the indicator (with an average 
score of 4) to the most disadvantaged in the upper quintile (with an average score of 
56) reveals an extreme contrast in socio-economic statuses in our sample of registered 
voters. In 2017, all the respondents in the first quintile lived in couples, owned their 
apartments, had been on holiday, exercised, and had attended shows or watched mov-
 
most correlated to the factor, explaining 91% of the variance, were selected for the EPICES score and 
weighted accordingly.  
6 
In 2017 the mean was 26.4, the median 16.5, and the standard deviation 18.9.  
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ies in the past year, while none had experienced financial problems. At the other end, 
55% of respondents lived alone, 60% had not recently exercised, 64% did not own their 
apartment, 70% had not taken a holiday, half had nobody to turn to for help in an 
emergency, and 76% could barely make ends meet every month. These gaps are all the 
more striking in that citizens who make the effort to register to vote are, on the whole, 
socially and culturally more advantaged than the unregistered7.   
 
Figure 1. EPICES scores by socioeconomic status 
 
 
 
Source: French Election Study 2017 
 
EPICES indicator scores are, as expected, correlated with other indicators of social 
and economic insecurity. They rise among respondents with low income, little educa-
tion, blue-collar jobs, fixed-time or part-time contracts, or who are unemployed. They 
 
7
Unregistered voters, according to INSEE surveys (the Census office) based on an examination of electoral 
lists after each election using a large sample taken from a larger permanent sample representative of all 
people born in France (Echantillon Démographique Permanent/Permanent Demographic Sample) for 
whom INSEE has corresponding census data (Durier and Touré 2018).   
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are higher among young people, women, and foreign-born respondents. They reach 
their highest level among single mothers, whose score on the EPICES index is 17 points 
above the sample’s average (Figure 1). A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the 
items in the EPICES index and the aforementioned indicators shows that they all load 
on a first factor of social insecurity or “precariousness”8. The advantage of the EPICES 
index is that it provides a synthetic measure combining these different dimensions. Ac-
cording to the conventional definition used by the social services, a score of 30 or 
above on the EPICES index indicates social vulnerability. 39% of the 2017 electoral 
sample falls into this category – a figure that is much higher than the share of people 
who are unemployed, below the poverty line, or in unprotected jobs - and 3 points 
above the share recorded at the 2012 presidential election (Braconnier and Mayer 
2015, 23). While precariousness is, as expected, higher among voters in the lower in-
come quartile (75%), manual workers (53%), and voters with primary school education 
only (53%), it also affects higher class, educated, and upper-income voters: 15% of the 
category of senior managers and professionals (cadres supérieurs), 20% of respondents 
in the middle-income quintile (2,501 – 4,000 euros monthly), and 22% of university 
graduates. The social insecurity that the EPICES index captures is a diffuse phenome-
non that can cut through class and status lines (Rehm et al. 2012).    
  
 
3. The effect of precariousness on voting turnout 
 
Measuring turnout in opinion surveys is difficult, because abstention is still consid-
ered un-civic behaviour and systematically underreported. The options to answer the 
questions about turnout in the 2017 presidential election were worded in order to 
make it easier for respondents to answer honestly: “You did not go to the polls; you 
thought about going but ended up not going; you usually vote but this time you didn’t; 
you voted”. A combination of the first three answers yields a declared rate of absten-
tion of 15% in the first round, and 19.2% in the second: 7 and 6 percentage points be-
low the actual rates respectively. Considering those respondents who declared they 
 
8
 See the results of the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) in Appendix A, Tables A2a-A2b. 
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voted but did not answer the next question on whom they voted as abstainers yields a 
result closer to the actual figures: 19% and 23%.  
In confirmation of the first hypothesis (H1), social insecurity depresses turnout. If 
claimed abstention is used as the indicator, the share of non-voters in the first round 
ranges between 5% in the first quintile and 29% in the last, that is, the most precarious 
(Table 1). If respondents who did not declare their choice are added, the rates increase 
to 8% and 35%. Finally, if those who say they voted but cast a void or blank ballot are 
added – because although this reflects an effort to go to the polls9, in the final instance 
it means not choosing between the competing candidates – then the share of respond-
ents who fail to express any electoral preference rises to 13% in the lower quintile and 
38% in the upper.  
 
Table 1. Abstention and non-expressed votes by rising level of precariousness (%) 
 
2017 Presidential election 1
st
 round Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total 
Declared abstention  5 10 14 19 29 15 
Abstention+No vote declared 8 12,5 19 22 35 19 
Blank or void ballot 5 3 3,5 4 3 4 
Total Non Expressed Votes 13 16 22 26 38 23 
2017 Presidential election 2
d
 round       
Declared abstention 10 14 17 22 36 20 
Abstention+No vote declared  14 17 21 25 39.5 23 
Blank or void ballot 12 16 12 17 12 14 
Total Non Expressed Votes 26 32 33 42 52 37 
 
Source: French Election Study 2017 
 
The second-round figures are even more impressive. The 2017 presidential election 
was unusual, since it was dominated by the Macron phenomenon traditional political 
markers were blurred. With the mainstream candidates of both the right and left elim-
inated, the second round became a faceoff between a centrist and an extremist, both 
of whom rejected the left-right divide, albeit for different reasons. Turnout usually in-
creases in the second, decisive, round. Yet this time, in a reflection of voters’ perplexi-
ty, it decreased from 77.7% in the first round to 74.5% in the second, while the share of 
void or blank ballots exploded, reaching an unprecedented record of 8.5% of registered 
 
9
 On the complex meaning of such ballots see Zulfikarpasic (2001) and more recently Moualek (2016).  
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voters and 11.5% of valid votes. This disarray appears in the survey. The share of de-
clared abstainers rises from 10% to 36% as one moves from the first to the last level of 
precariousness; from 14% to almost 40% if respondents who do not declare their vote 
are included; adding blank and void ballot yields a total share of unexpressed prefer-
ences of a quarter among the least precarious voters and more than half among the 
most precarious (Table 1). Social insecurity does indeed have a demobilizing effect on 
electoral participation, and it silences the voices of the disadvantaged.  One must also 
bear in mind that the actual political self-exclusion process is broader, considering that 
the citizens who did not even register to vote are not included in our survey sample10.  
 
Figure 2. Turnout in 2017 by rising level of precariousness 
 
 
 
 
10
 INSEE estimates that the share of unregistered voters among French eligible citizens was around 12% on 
the eve of the 2017 presidential election, checking registration on the electoral lists on a panel of citizens 
(drawn from its Permanent Demographic Panel, supra). The shares rise among manual workers, the un-
employed, and people without any education, of which only 60% are registered (Durier and Touré 2018). 
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Source: French Election Study 2017 
 
A final way to outline this political exclusion process is to measure the share of re-
spondents who did not participate in either round, that is, who are completely out of 
the game. The census office (INSEE) regularly measures this “consistent abstention” by 
reviewing actual registration lists – a far more reliable method than survey data. It es-
timates that 15% of registered voters did not go to the polls in either round of the pres-
idential election (Buisson and Penant 2017). In our survey, the declared share is very 
close to this figure: 13 %. However, it varies between 2% and 26% as one moves along 
the scale of precariousness, while the share of consistent voters drops from 87% to 
61% (Figure 2).  
Other variables affecting turnout must also be considered. The “civic voluntarism 
model” (Verba et al. 1995) posits three main reasons for limited political participation 
amongst citizens. They can’t participate: they lack the necessary resources (education, 
social status). They don’t want to participate: they lack motivation (political interest, 
political trust, sense of efficacy). They were not asked to participate: they are not inte-
grated in mobilizing networks. A series of binary logistic regressions test the specific 
impact of social insecurity controlled for all these factors. The dependent variable is 
consistent abstention (not voting in either round). The predictors, in addition to the 
EPICES index, are gender, age, education, monthly income by consumption unit, occu-
pation (taking into account former occupation for unemployed or retired respondents), 
an indicator of religious integration mixing religious affiliation (Catholic or minority re-
ligion) and church attendance, and an indicator of immigrant background (having at 
least one non-French parent or grandparent)11. All variables have a significant impact 
on consistent abstention, in the expected direction.  Being a man, young – especially 
between 25 and 34 years old – with little education, especially just a vocational degree, 
and being of foreign origin or belonging to a minority religion (essentially Muslim) – are 
all factors that increase the chances of systematically avoiding the polls. Conversely, 
belonging to the occupational group of “intermediate professions”, which includes 
mid-level managers, executives, and “socio-cultural specialists” (Kriesi 1989), that is, 
healthcare professionals, teachers, social welfare workers, and media professionals, 
with high levels of education, sharply decreases the probability of abstaining as well as 
 
11
 See the regressions with both models in Appendix B (table B1). 
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belonging to the penultimate income quintile. But precariousness has by far the largest 
impact. If the level of political interest is added – a key factor in electoral participation 
– it cancels the effect of age and religion, and considerably lowers the effect of educa-
tion, but not the impact of precariousness. Once controlled for all variables, the pre-
dicted likelihood of abstaining in both rounds rises from 2% among the most secure 
voters in the first EPICES decile, to 22% among the most insecure in the last decile (Fig-
ure 3). The marginal effect of social insecurity is 0.0512, meaning that each additional 
increase by one standard deviation on the EPICES index increases the probability of 
consistent abstention by 5 percentage points, all things being equal. 
 
 
Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of constant abstention by precariousness 
 
 
 
Source: French Election Study 2017. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence 
 
12
 Statistically significant predicted probability (p < 0.01).  
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4. The effect of social insecurity on vote choice 
 
4. 1 Respondents who express a vote choice and those who don’t 
 
Turning to consider the voters who expressed a choice, social insecurity seems, as 
expected (H2), to cause a turn away from the mainstream parties to favour the ex-
tremes, especially the radical right. As for turnout, we can start with simple bivariate 
tables and then run logistic regressions. In the first round, as one moves up the scale of 
precariousness, support for Mélenchon rises from 16% to 23% - 3 percentage points 
above his national score; support for Le Pen rises from 11% to 36% (almost 15 points 
above her national score). Meanwhile, support for the conservative candidate Fillon, 
the leader of Les Républicains, plummets from 28% to 9% (11.5 points below his na-
tional score), and for the centrist Macron, support drops from 30% to 18% (6 points be-
low). On the whole, the leaders of En marche! and Les Républicains come out ahead 
among economically secure voters (quintiles 1-2), while the FN candidate is ahead 
among the less secure (quintiles 3-5). In the second round, the contrast is even sharp-
er, with the FN leader’s score rising from 19% among the least precarious to a record 
53% among the most precarious (Table 2a).    
 
Table 2. Declared votes in 2017 presidential election by rising levels of precariousness (%) 
 
a) On the basis of expressed votes 
 
1
st
 round  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total 
Mélenchon  16 20 19 23 23 20 
Hamon 9 6 5 5 6 6 
Macron 30 29 20 18 18 24 
Fillon 28 25 21 12 9 20 
M. Le Pen 11 13 24 31 36 22 
Other candidates  6 8 11 11 9 9 
2
d
 round       
Macron 81 78 63.5 52.5 47 66 
M. Le Pen  19 22 37.5 47.5 53 34 
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b) On the basis of all registered voters 
 
1
st
 round Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total 
Mélenchon  14 17 15 17 14 15 
Hamon 8 5 4 4 4 5 
Macron 26 25 16 13 12 18 
Fillon 25 21 17 9 5 15 
M. Le Pen 9 11 19 23 22 17 
Other candidates  6 7 9 8 5 7 
Did not express a vote 14 16 21 26 38 23 
2
d
 round       
Macron 59 53 42 31 24 42 
M. Le Pen  14 15 25 28 27 22 
Did not express a vote
 
27 32 33 41 49 36 
 
Source: French Election Study 2017, weighted by the 2017 election results for each round and socio-
demographics (age, gender, education). 
 
The picture changes if one adds the voters who did not express a preference, con-
sidering exit as an electoral option per se (Table 2b), to the mix. In this case the most 
striking impact of social insecurity is not so much that it boosts support for radical can-
didates, or depresses support for those on the right and in the centre, but that it keeps 
such large sections of the potential electorate from the polls entirely. In the first round, 
the “no vote” option is ahead of all other voting options for the three upper quintiles 
of precariousness. In the second round – the decisive one – it is ahead in the last two 
quintiles. In the most precarious quintile (5), practically half the voters express no pref-
erence. In this light, the most insecure voters’ support for radical candidates is less ob-
vious. Precariousness has no more impact on support for Mélenchon. While it still im-
pacts support for Le Pen, her average scores in the two upper quintiles do not exceed 
23% in the first round and 28% in the second (Table 2b). 
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Figure 4. Predicted voting probabilities by deciles of precariousness controlling for socio-demographic 
variables  
 
a) 1
st
 round of the 2017 presidential election 
 
 
b) 2
nd
 round of the 2017 presidential election  
 
 
Source: French Election Study 2017. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Based on 
multinomial logistic regression (Tables B2-B3, Appendix B). 
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Validating these results requires some consideration of other factors likely to affect 
vote choice. A series of multinomial logistic regressions13 tests the electoral impact of 
precariousness (measured by the EPICES index), controlling first for socio-demographic 
variables (age, gender, education, income by consumption units, occupation, and reli-
gion), and then political variables (presented in Appendix A): position on a 10-point 
left-right scale and attitudinal scales measuring opinions about central issues in the 
campaign, including the European Union (level of anti-EU sentiment), state interven-
tion in the economy (level of economic conservatism)14, immigration (level of ethno-
centrism), and LGBT and gender issues (level of cultural conservatism). The dependent 
variables in the first round are votes for Mélenchon (La France Insoumise), Hamon (So-
cialist party), Macron (En marche!), Fillon (Les Républicains), Le Pen (Front National), 
one of the six smaller candidates considered as a unit, and no vote (abstention, void or 
blank ballot, no answer). In the second round, the dependent variable is a vote for Le 
Pen. The Macron vote is the reference category in both rounds. Each model was tested 
first only on those that voted for a candidate, and then on the whole sample. Because 
political exit is so frequent among precarious voters, the focus here is on the results for 
the full sample, i.e. that including voters who did not vote for any specific candidate15. 
The following figures show the predicted probabilities of voting for the main candi-
dates by decile of precariousness, while the marginal effects sum up the size of each 
variable’s effect in the theoretical model for all candidates, all things being equal.  
For the radical right vote, after controlling for socio-demographic variables, youth 
and lack of education appear to be the main predictors. However, precariousness has a 
moderate but statistically significant impact, while income by consumption units has 
none. The predicted probabilities of voting for Le Pen vary between 11% and 17% in 
the first round, and 12% to 19% in the second, as one moves from the first to the last 
decile of precariousness (Figure 4a and 4b). The marginal increase of her score for an 
increase of one standard deviation on the EPICES scale, in both rounds, is around 2 
 
13
 All the regressions are in Appendix B (Tables B2-B3).  
14
 “Economic conservatism” actually refers here to what the French call “economic liberalism”: being pro-
market and against state intervention in the economy.  
15
 The 4 logistic regressions on the basis of voters expressing a choice for a candidate, without considering 
exit as an option, are available on request.  
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percentage points (Tables B5a and B5b in Appendix B)16. But introducing attitudes into 
the model wipes out the impact of precariousness in both rounds completely (Figures 
5a and 5b). What drove support for Le Pen in this election was fear of immigrants and 
of a European Union seen as opening the door to them. If one looks at the marginal ef-
fects, one standard-deviation increase on the ethnocentrism scale raises the probabil-
ity of voting for Le Pen by 8 percentage points in both rounds; one standard-deviation 
increase to the right on the left-right scale adds 7.5 points in the first round and 5 
points in the second, while anti–EU feelings contribute almost 6 points to Le Pen’s 
score in the first round, and 7 points in the second. Economic and cultural conserva-
tism have no significant impact (Tables B5a and B5b in Appendix B)17.  
For the radical left, the impact of precariousness on votes is not significant after con-
trolling for socio-demographic variables, and the effect is even slightly negative when 
attitudes are introduced into the model (Figure 4a and 5a).  The marginal effect of one 
standard-deviation increase of precariousness decreases the probability of a vote for 
Mélenchon by 2 percentage points (Table B5a in Appendix B)18.  These voters are the 
polar opposites of those who voted for Le Pen. They are driven by a rejection of ethno-
centrism, a rejection of economic liberalism, and above all ideological self-
identification with the far left. The increase of one standard deviation to the left on the 
left-right scale increases the probability of voting this way by 12 percentage points. Ed-
ucation makes the difference: while the chances of voting for the radical right increase 
among the least educated, there is a significant positive relation between education 
and support for Mélenchon (Table B5a in Appendix B).   
Lastly, the results confirm the major impact of social insecurity on political with-
drawal. In the first round, each increase of one standard deviation on the precarious-
ness index increases the probability of not expressing a candidate choice by almost 8 
points after controlling for socio-demographic variables, by 9 points if attitudes are 
considered, and by 10 points in the second round regardless of control variables (Ta-
bles B5a and B5b in Appendix B). By contrast, Macron predominantly attracts the most 
secure voters. Each increase of one standard deviation on the EPICES index reduces the 
 
16
 However, the effects are at the limit of statistical significance (p < 0.10).   
17
 The marginal effects of attitudes on vote choices are all statistically significant (p< 0.01). The tables of 
marginal effects for all the main candidates are available in Appendix B, with the corresponding regres-
sions (Tables B2-B5).   
18
 However, the effect of precariousness is at the limit of statistical significance (p < 0.10). 
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probability of voting for Macron in the first round by 5 points after controlling for so-
cio-demographic variables, by 4 when attitudes are considered in the first round, and 
by 12 and 9 in the second round. This aligns with the fact that the classification of indi-
viduals in the middle and upper middle-income groups (quintiles 3 and 4, compared to 
the richest voters in quintile 5) also increase his chances by 10 percentage points in the 
decisive round. The main attitude driving these voters is support for European integra-
tion. A one standard-deviation increase on the anti-EU scale decreases the chances of a 
vote for Macron by 13 percentage points in the first round, and almost 19 in the sec-
ond (Table B5a and B5b in Appendix B) 19.  
 
Figure 5. Predicted voting probabilities by deciles of precariousness controlling for socio-demographic 
and attitudinal variables 
 
a) 1
st
 round of the 2017 presidential election 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19
 The marginal effects of precariousness and of anti-EU feelings on the Macron vote and on political with-
drawal are statistically significant (p< 0.01).  
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a) 2
nd
 round of the 2017 presidential election 
 
Source: French Election Study 2017. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Based on 
multinomial logistic regression (Tables B2-B3, Appendix B) 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The findings presented here primarily show that precariousness hinders participa-
tion in the electoral process. Social exclusion breeds political exclusion. For “When a 
person experiences economic adversity his scarce resources are spent on holding body 
and soul together – surviving – not on remote concerns like politics” (Rosenstone 1982, 
26). In the second round of the 2017 presidential election, more than half of the voters 
in the upper quintile of the EPICES score either failed to vote or did not choose a specif-
ic candidate. This shrinks the constituency Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon 
claim to have among the underprivileged considerably. While there is a statistically sig-
nificant positive association between scores on our indicator of precariousness and 
support for the two populist candidates after controlling for socio-demographic varia-
bles, this disappears when one takes into account political attitudes, and even be-
comes slightly negative for the radical left candidate. Social insecurity does not neces-
sarily breed support for populism. The most insecure are difficult to mobilize. And if 
they vote, what counts first is how they feel about the European Union, immigration, 
government intervention, and their position on the left-right scale. By contrast, the in-
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dicator of precariousness has a strong but negative impact, resisting all controls, on 
support for Macron, while income has a positive effect. Macron clearly is the president 
of the well-off and economically secure voters.  
 
Figure 6. Location on left right scale by scores on precariousness index  
 
 
 
Source: French Election Study 2017 
 
Can one generalize from the French elections of 2017? The 2017 elections were unu-
sual, marked by the breakdown of old parties, a populist dynamic, and the surprise vic-
tory of the leader of En marche! The 2012 presidential election took place in a different 
setting, with a classical opposition between the candidates of the left and right main-
stream parties. The main trend was a massive rejection of the outgoing President, Ni-
colas Sarkozy. This boosted Marine Le Pen’s score in the first round, but benefited the 
socialist Left and its leader, François Hollande, in the second. Precariousness, measured 
by the same EPICES index, amplified these trends for the main part. After controlling 
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for age, gender, occupation, religion, and education, it had no significant impact on 
support for Marine Le Pen, but a positive effect on support for Francois Hollande, es-
pecially in the second round. A qualitative study conducted before the first round of 
the election on the political impact of precariousness, based on interviews with people 
living on welfare and charity support, confirmed antipathy for Sarkozy. He was de-
scribed as “the president of the rich” who made “the rich richer and the poor poorer”, 
while Hollande was the candidate who defended “the poor”, the “little ones”, and the 
working class (Braconnier and Mayer 2015, 201-234). Social insecurity can produce 
contrasting political effects. Although this was not the case in 2017, it may one day tilt 
support towards the radical left, as suggested by the relation between respondents’ 
positions on the left-right scale and their EPICES index scores (Figure 6). While the 
share of respondents who refuse to choose between the left and right rises with the 
level of precariousness (either refusing to answer or choosing a central position), so 
does the share of respondents who position themselves at either of the extremes, 
whether the far right (from 3% in the first quintile to 8% in the upper one) or the far 
left (from 3% to 10%). Potential support for the radical left exists among the most dis-
advantaged.  
Our study focuses on the French case, and to date there is no EPICES score equiva-
lent elsewhere. However, recent studies on the electoral impact of employment pre-
cariousness or “outsiderness” have yielded results similar to ours. Drawing from 5 
waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) in 17 Western European countries and com-
bining 4 different operationalisations of outsiderness (based on current labour market 
status or on occupational class groups), Jan and Allison Rovny (2017) show that outsid-
ers are less likely than insiders to vote for major right-wing parties, and more likely to 
abstain from voting. The authors also outline the internal diversity of the outsiders. 
Those in occupational groups at risk of outsiderness are attracted to right-wing populist 
rhetoric, while individuals who actually face bad labour market conditions (unem-
ployed, temporarily employed) are more inclined towards left-wing populist rhetoric. 
This very much aligns with the results of the principal component analysis (Table A2a-
A2b in Appendix A). It shows two factors. While all the items load on a first factor of 
“social precariousness”, on the second factor material deprivation indicators are posi-
tively correlated, but social isolation indicators are negatively correlated: this can be 
described as “connected precariousness”. The high scorers on the first factor of “social 
precariousness” are elderly, uneducated, and socially isolated. Meanwhile, those who 
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score highly on the second factor of “connected precariousness” are younger, have at-
tended college and sometimes university, are connected to the outside world, have 
networks, friends and family ties, but have no job security, filling low-pay, short-term 
temporary positions, and find it difficult to make ends meet. Politically, the former 
tend to abstain, and those who do vote are more likely to support the radical right. The 
latter go to the polls more often, and when they vote they lean more towards the radi-
cal left. Contrary to the assumption of Guy Standing (2011), there is no such thing, at 
least in France today, as a unified emerging “class” of the “precariat”.    
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APPENDIX A 
 
1. Attitudinal scale items 
 
Left-right scale  
 
“In politics people talk about the right and the left. On a scale from 0 to 10 where would you place 
yourself, personally, 0 meaning you are more on the right and 10 more on the left? The scores in be-
tween allow you to qualify your opinion”.   
 
Cultural conservatism 
 
“Homosexual couples have the right to adopt children/Women are primarily meant to have and raise 
children/It’s normal that a woman has the choice to abort/Homosexuality is an acceptable way of 
leading one’s sexual life: somewhat agree, strongly agree, some-what disagree, strongly disagree”. 
 
Anti-European sentiment 
 
“All things considered, do you think that France has benefited or has not benefited from its member-
ship in the European Union? Yes, it benefited, no it did not”. 
 
“Do you think that for France belonging to the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, neither 
good nor bad”.  
 
“One should strengthen the powers of Europe even it if leads to reduce the independence of France: 
somewhat agree, strongly agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree” 
. 
“The European integration hinders the good functioning of democracy in France: somewhat agree, 
strongly agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree”. 
 
Ethnocentrism 
 
“There are too many immigrants in France: somewhat agree, strongly agree, somewhat disagree, 
strongly disagree”. 
 
“All in all immigrants are a threat for the French culture: somewhat agree, strongly agree, neither 
agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree”. 
 
“Many immigrants come in France just to take advantage of the Social Security system: somewhat 
agree, strongly agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree”. 
 
“Immigrants are responsible for the rise of crime rates: somewhat agree, strongly agree, neither 
agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree”. 
 
Economic conservatism 
 
“The government should take measures to reduce income inequalities: somewhat agree, strongly 
agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree”. 
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“To establish social justice one should take from the rich to give to the poor: somewhat agree, 
strongly agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree”. 
 
-Do you think in the coming years one should give priority to the competitiveness of the French 
economy, or to the improvement of the workers’ situation?” 
 
“To face economic difficulties do you think the state should trust the companies and give them more 
leeway, or on the contrary it should control and regulate them more tightly?”  
 
(All scales were standardized (Mean=0, SD=1) to allow for comparison).  
 
2. Principal Components Analysis (PCA) on factors of precariousness 
 
The analysis is run with 16 items, adding to the 11 that compose the EPICES score indicators of in-
come, employment and marital status. The first five factors explain 50.7% of the total variance, of 
which the first 18.2% of the variance (eigenvalue: 2.916), the second 10.6% (eigenvalue: 1.694), the 
third 7.9% (eigenvalue :1.262), the fourth  7.6% (eigenvalue 1.223) and the fifth 6.3% (eigenvalue: 
1.022). 
 
Table A2a.  Matrix of components  
 
 
Components 
1 2 3 4 5 
Single mother ,321 ,316 -,275 ,342 -,280 
Unwanted part time  ,065 ,310 ,529 -,060 -,219 
Fixed contract ,262 ,374 ,379 ,000 ,180 
Unemployed ,339 ,230 ,385 -,043 ,054 
Lowest quartile income ,653 ,272 -,235 -,040 ,021 
Sees a social worker ,334 ,249 ,026 ,029 -,430 
Additional Health Insurance  ,232 ,000 ,107 ,075 ,778 
Not in couple ,466 ,337 -,550 ,202 ,120 
Does not own house ,562 ,331 ,008 ,009 ,112 
Financial difficulties ,497 ,182 ,308 -,118 -,086 
No sport in last 12 months ,355 -,368 -,120 -,464 -,135 
No movies or shows  in last 12 months ,461 -,286 -,013 -,505 -,040 
No holidays in last 12 months ,599 -,231 -,112 -,366 ,057 
No contact with family in  last 6 months ,373 -,311 -,133 ,231 ,026 
Nobody who could host you if problem  ,485 -,500 ,224 ,446 -,063 
Nobody who could give material assistance ,427 -,543 ,233 ,425 -,082 
 
Source: French Election Study 2017 
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Table A2b. Regression factor scores by age, education and vote 
 
 1st factor 
“Social precariousness” 
2
nd
 factor 
“Connected precariousness” 
Age   
18-24 0.167 0.646 
25-34 0.100 0.316 
35-49 -0.714 0.257 
50-64 -0.001 -0.123 
65+ -0.059 -0.538 
Education   
Primary 0.449 -0.329 
Vocational 0.170 -0.036 
Secondary -0.080 0.158 
Higher education -0.437 0.170 
Vote 1st round 2017   
No vote  0.370 -0.114 
Vote Mélenchon 0.003 0.308 
Vote Macron -0.329 0.001 
Vote Le Pen  0.302 -0.015 
 
Source: French Election Study 2017 
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APPENDIX B 
 
1. Logistic regressions on abstention/votes in the French 2017 presidential election 
 
All scales including the precariousness scale (the EPICES index)20 are standardized (mean= 0, sd= 1) to facilitate comparison. Model 1 tests the impact of pre-
cariousness controlling for socio demographic variables, model 2 adds political attitudes. For the 1st round, to save space, we only present the coefficients 
for the main candidates. The results for the socialist candidate Benoît Hamon (4.8 % of the votes) and the bloc of residual candidates  (6.6 % of the votes all 
together: Nathalie Artaud, François Asselineau, Nicolas Dupont–Aignan, Jacques Cheminade, Jean Lassalle, Philippe Poutou) are available on demand. 
 
Table B1. Binary logistic regression on constant abstention (in both rounds) 
 
  
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
   
 
GENDER 
  
 
Women 
 
0.363** 
 
0.426** 
 (0.175) (0.179) 
Men (REF)   
   
 
 
AGE 
  
 
18-24 
 
0.591* 
 
0.505 
 (0.317) (0.323) 
25-34 0.487* 0.489 
 (0.277) (0.284) 
35-49 0.109 0.116 
 (0.260) (0.265) 
50-64 -0.298 -0.254 
 (0.252) (0.255) 
+65 (REF)   
 
20
 Figures 4a-4b, 5a-5b (predicted probabilities of votes by precariousness in 2 rounds) are based on the same regressions but use EPICES deciles rather than the standardized Score Epices, 
which makes the graphs easier to read.  
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EDUCATION   
 
Primary 
 
0.315 
 
0.136 
 (0.296) (0.305) 
Vocational 0.566** 0.390 
 (0.257) (0.266) 
Secondary 0.256 0.219 
 (0.264) (0.269) 
College(REF) 
 
  
 
INCOME 
  
 
N/A 
 
-0 .248 
 
-0.429 
 (0.379) (0.388) 
Q1 -0.237 -0.312 
 (0.348) (0.354) 
Q2 -0.392 -0.449 
 (0.336) (0.340) 
Q3 -0.268 -0.336 
 (0.349) (0.354) 
Q4 -0.623* -0.701* 
 (0.366) (0.370) 
Q5 (REF) 
 
  
 
EMPLOYMENT 
  
 
Not working 
 
0.123 
 
0.038 
 (0.356) (0.362) 
Self-Employed -0.259 -0.311 
 (0.407) (0.410) 
Intermediary -0.777** -0.831** 
 (0.395) (0.400) 
Routine non-manual 0.066 -0.006 
 (0.335) (0.340) 
Manual worker 0.160 0.044 
 (0.348) (0.355) 
Manager(REF) 
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RELIGION 
 
Practicing Catholic 
 
-0.344 
 
-0.324 
 (0.460) (0.462) 
Occasional 0.212 0.146 
 (0.298) (0.303) 
No Practice 0.261 0.203 
 (0.190) (0.193) 
Other Faith 0.519* 0.519* 
 (0.289) (0.292) 
No religion (REF) 
 
 
ORIGIN 
 
  
2 foreign parents 0.586** 0.579** 
 (0.260) (0.263) 
1 of them 0.545** 0.510** 
 (0.245) (0.249) 
None (REF)   
SCALE   
Precariousness 0.734*** 0.708*** 
 (0.092) (0.094) 
POLITICAL INTEREST 
 
Not at all 
  
 
1.249*** 
  (0.299) 
A little  0.272 
  (0.281) 
Somewhat  0.094 
  (0.289) 
Very much (REF)   
   
Constant -2.801*** -2,913*** 
 (0.371) (0.413) 
N 1830 1830 
Log likelihood 1141.917 1109.118 
X2 (df) 194,639 (25) 227.185(28) 
Pseudo R2 0.195 0.225 
   
B coefficient, standard errors in brackets   Sig *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B2. Multinomial logistic regression on votes in 1
st
 round 
 
 JLM Fillon MLP No Vote 
 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
         
 
GENDER 
        
        0.569*** 
Men 0.347** 0.485** -0.585** -0.158 0.107 0.167 0.461***        
    (0.176) (0.196) (0.264) (0.229) (0.190) (0.224) (0.173) (0.184) 
Women (REF)         
         
 
AGE 
        
         
18-24 1.264*** 1.460*** 0.509 0.384 1.758*** 2.530*** 1.150*** 1.1442*** 
 (0.362) (0.399) (0.578) (0.544) (0.387) (0.457) (0.350) (0.373) 
25-34 1.419*** 1.524*** 0.498 -0.382 1.717*** 1.987*** 1.290*** 1.282*** 
 (0.308) (0.335) (0.473) (0.453) (0.335) (0.388) (0.299) (0.316) 
35-49 0.743** 0.915*** 0.728** -0.035 1.411*** 1.946 0.630** 0.770*** 
 (0.261) (0.287) (0.366) (0.318) (0.278) (0.332) (0.249) (0.264) 
50-64 0.247 0.209 0.255 -0.620** 0.536** 0.593** 0.123 -0.141 
 (0.237) (0.260) (0.347) (0.278) (0.248) (0.292) (0.220) (0.232) 
         
 
 
        
EDUCATION         
         
Primary 0.288 0.061 -0.159 0.167 1.628*** 0.716* 1.080*** 0.609** 
 (0.293) (0.329) (0.466) (0.369) (0.316) (0.378) (0.284) (0.306) 
Vocational -0.182 -0.058 -0.133 0.048 1.277*** 0.481 1.135** 0.715*** 
 (0.248) (0.277) (0.376) (0343) (0.278) (0.329) (0.246) (0.262) 
Secondary -0.116 -0.318 -0.019 0.072 0.474* -0.044 0.262 -0.053 
 (0.229) (0.256) (0.327) (0.302) (0.275) (0.323) (0.240) (0.253) 
College (REF)         
         
 
INCOME 
        
         
N/A 0.251 0.062 -0.046 -0.538 0.211 -0.050 0.632** 0.463 
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 (0.351) (0.387) (0.522) (0.408) (0.398) (0.451) (0.318) (0.335) 
Q1 0.499 0.202 0.109 -0.999** 0.508 0.205 0.191 0.106 
 (0.337) (0.370 (0.504) (0.461) (0.374) (0.433) (0.325) (0.342) 
Q2 0.683** 0.347 0.220 -0.481 0.587* 0.484 -0.15 -0.120 
 (0.297) (0.327) (0.435) (0.376) (0.338) (0.393) (0.297) (0.312) 
Q3 0.505 0.222 0.196 0.017 0.278 -0.154 -0.45 -0.187 
 (0.302) (0.332) (0.434) (0.364) (0.354) (0.414) (0.304) (0.319) 
Q4 0.135 -0.152 0.451 -0.184 0.000 -0.398 -0.262 -0.422 
 (0.274) (0.304) (0.360) (0.307) (0.337) (0.393) (0.279) (0.293) 
Q5 (REF)         
         
EMPLOYMENT         
         
Not working -0.127 -0.203 -0.429 -0.886 0.431 -0.561 -0.447 -0.715** 
 (0.323) (0.362) (0.481) (0.433) (0.436) (0.500) (0.327) (0.343) 
Self-Employed 0.000 0.512 0.291 1.026*** 1.262*** 1.141** -0.023 -0.003 
 (0.402) (0.446) (0.556) (0.397) (0.469) (0.529) (0.376) (0.394) 
Intermediary 0.198 0.197 0.067 -0.661 0.940** 0.520 -0.168 -0.409 
 (0.275) (0.306) (0.367) (0.350) (0.397) (0.452) (0.286) (0.299) 
Routine non-manual 0.574* 0.670** 0.127 -0.192 1.188*** 0.770* 0.271 0.084 
 (0.293) (0.325) (0.406) (0.359) (0.407) (0.464) (0.294) (0.305 
Manual worker 0.172 0.034 0.292 -0.279 0.894** 0.567 0.046 -0.179 
 (0.331) (0.365) (0.485) (0.436) (0.431) (0.493) (0.321) (0.335) 
Manager (REF)         
         
RELIGION         
         
Practicing Catholic -1.149** 0.910 -0.343 1.779*** -0.218 -0.409 -0.219 -0.242 
 (0.471) (0.529) (0.549) (0.427) (0.431) (0.494) (0.381) (0.403) 
Occasional -1.037*** -0.584 -1.331** 1.235*** 0.207 0.113 -0.141 -0.113 
 (0.328) (0.361) (0.563) (0.384) (0.295) (0.347) (0.286) (0.304) 
No Practice -0.665*** -0.302 -0.576** 0.712** -0.039 -0.185 -0.225 -0.233 
 (0.187) (0.208) (0.266) (0.305) (0.201) (0.240) (0.186) (0.198) 
Other Faith 0.235 0.494 -0.282 0.808 -0.943** -0.820 0.515 0.609* 
 (0.311) (0.350) (0.483) (0.726) (0.457) (0.522) (0.316) (0.341) 
No Religion (REF)         
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SCALES 
         
Precariousness 0.201* 0.050 0.048 -0.49 0.395*** 0.175 0.598*** 0.453*** 
 (0.104) (0.114) (0.157) (0.146) (0.106) (0.124) (0.098) (0.104) 
Left-Right position  -0.762***  1.298***  0.780***  0.046 
  (0.117)  (0.157)  (0.127)  (0.110) 
Ethnocentrism  0.220*  0.284**  0.972***  0.196* 
  (0.117)  (0.135)  (0.130)  (0.104) 
Economic conservatism  -0.755***  0.538***  -0.315***  -0.261*** 
  (0.104)  (0.126)  (0.116)  (0.094) 
Cultural conservatism  -0.096  0.168  -0.315  0.032 
  (0.118)  (0.127)  (0.116)  (0.102) 
Anti-EU sentiment  0.628***  0.359**  1.171  0.823*** 
  (0.115)  (0.141)  (0.121)  (0.107) 
         
Constant -0.964** 
(0.325) 
-1.285*** 
(0.380) 
-1.193*** 
(0.443) 
-1.398** 
(0.449) 
-3.047*** 
(0.452) 
-2.671*** 
(0.536) 
-0.997*** 
(0.317) 
-0.339 
(0.347) 
Observations 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 
 
B coefficient, standard errors in brackets    Sig *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   Reference category Macron 
Model 1 Log likelihood 5937.730  Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke: 0.336   X2 (df): 723.323(138)*** 
Model 2 Log Likelihood  5019.419  PseudoR2 Nagelkerke: 0.629  X2 (df):1738.873 (168)*** 
 
 
Table B3. Multinomial logistic regression on votes in the 2nd round  
 
 Le Pen No Vote 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
 
GENDER 
 
 
0.199 
 
 
0.226 
 
 
0.527*** 
 
 
0.570*** 
 
Women 
(0.156) (0.188) (0.123) (0.133) 
     
Men (REF)     
     
AGE     
 
18-24 
 
1.298*** 
 
2.043*** 
 
0.885*** 
 
1.112*** 
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 (0.308) (0. 371) (0.243) (0.263) 
25-34 1.429*** 1.780*** 0.980*** 1.006*** 
 (0.263) (0.314) (0.207) (0.222) 
35-49 1.164*** 1.654*** 0.676*** 0.816*** 
 (0.231) (0.281) (0.178) (0.192) 
50-64 0.705*** 0.873*** 0.170 0.202 
 (0.210) (0.251) (0.163) (0.175) 
+65 (REF) 
 
    
 
EDUCATION 
    
 
Primary 
 
1.068*** 
 
0.70 
 
0.478** 
 
-0.013 
 (0.258) (0.316) (0.200) (0.219) 
Vocational 0.849*** -0.011 0.336** -0.105 
 (0.223) (0.269) (0.171) (0.185) 
Secondary 0.392* -0.134 0.147 -0.132 
 (0.228) (0.270) (0.166) (0.178) 
College(REF) 
 
    
INCOME     
 
N/A 
 
0.191 
 
0.066 
 
0.375 
 
0.261 
 (0.329) (0.377) (0.232) (0.246) 
Q1 0.333 0.229 -0.082 -0.102 
 (0.302) (0.357) (0.230) (0.244) 
Q2 0.130 0.30 -0.169 -0.269 
 (0.278) (0.328) (0.207) (0.221) 
Q3 0.073 -0.256 -0.303 -0.451** 
 (0.289) (0.345) (0.215) (0.230) 
Q4 -0.017 -0.288 -0.314 -0.444** 
 (0.276) (0.327) (0.195) (0.208) 
Q5 (REF) 
 
    
EMPLOYMENT     
 
Not working 
 
0 .796** 
 
0.393 
 
0.059 
 
-0.125 
 (0.357) (0.416) (0.234) (0.248) 
Self-Employed 0.873** 0.732* -0.089 -0.071 
 (0.370) (0.426) (0.250) (0.267) 
Intermediary 0.842** 0.579 0.099 -0.060 
 (0.329) (0.379) (0.202) (0.214) 
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Routine non-manual 1.148*** 0.910** 0.372* 0.228 
 (0.328) (0.382) (0.206) (0.218) 
Manual worker 0.996*** 0.855** 0.070 -0.063 
 (0/346) (0.405) (0.230) (0.244) 
Manager(REF) 
 
    
 
 
RELIGION 
    
 
Practicing Catholic 
 
-0.177 
 
-0.511 
 
-0.437* 
 
-0.517* 
 (0.341) (0.403) (0.262) (0.282) 
Occasional 0.338 0.098 -0.026 -0.071 
 (0.250) (0.301) (0.205) (0.223) 
No Practice 0.423** 0.290 0.033 0.010 
 (.166) (0.201) (0.133) (0.145) 
Other Faith -0.980*** -0.827** -0.215 -0.163 
 (0.345) (0.401) (0.210) (0.228) 
No religion (REF) 
 
    
SCALES     
 
Precariousness 
 
0.383*** 
 
0.213** 
 
0.536*** 
 
0.434*** 
 (0.086) (0.102) (0.071) (0.075) 
Left-Right position  0.605***  -0.102 
  (0.095)  (0.072) 
Ethnocentrism  0.966***  0.330*** 
  (0.106)  (0.076) 
Economic conservatism  0.180*  -0.166** 
  (0.095)  (0.067) 
Cultural conservatism  0.38  -0.032 
  (0.093)  (0.073) 
Anti-EU sentiment  1.104***  0.681*** 
  (0.095)  (0.074) 
Constant -3.495*** -3.198*** -1.066*** -0.503** 
 (0.374) (0.445) (0.227) (0.249) 
Observations 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 
 
B, standard errors in brackets    Sig:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Reference category Macron 
Model 1 Log likelihood 3421.803  Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke : 0.185   X2 (df): 323.230 (46)*** 
Model 2 Log Likelihood  2941.798  PseudoR2 Nagelkerke : 0.428    X2 (df):857.740 (56)*** 
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2. Marginal effects of predictors on votes for all candidates computed on the base of the above multinomial regressions   
 
Marginal effects were computed on the basis of the above multinomial logistic regressions (Tables B2 and B3), predicting choices between Mélenchon, 
Hamon, Macron, Fillon, Le Pen, ‘Other candidates’ or ‘No vote’ in the 1st round (Table B2), and Le Pen, Macron or ‘No vote’ in the 2nd round (Table B3). The 
coefficients are the same whatever the reference category chosen in the regression. Model 1 includes socio demographic variables, model 2 adds political 
attitudes.  For the 1st round we only present the results for the main candidates  
 
Table B5a. Marginal effects of sociodemographic and attitudinal variables on votes in 1st round 
 
 JLM Macron Fillon MLP No Vote 
 
  VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
           
GENDER           
           
Women  
-0.0327 
 
-0.0318 
 
0.0373* 
 
0.0625** 
 
0.00932 
 
0.0197** 
 
0.0113 
 
0.0117 
-0.0591*** -0.0826*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0214) (0.0222) (0.0261) (0.0122) (0.00914) (0.0192) (0.0161) (0.0225) (0.0292) 
Men (REF)           
           
AGE           
           
18-24 0.0745* 0.0444 -0.165*** -0.223*** -0.0880*** -0.0428* 0.121*** 0.131*** 0.111** 0.149** 
 (0.0430) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0428) (0.0269) (0.0221) (0.0393) (0.0402) (0.0481) (0.0595) 
25-34 0.0936** 0.0873** -0.173*** -0.203*** -0.0948*** -0.0584*** 0.0986*** 0.0775*** 0.101** 0.120** 
 (0.0371) (0.0361) (0.0341) (0.0409) (0.0221) (0.0166) (0.0305) (0.0250) (0.0395) (0.0493) 
35-49 0.0301 0.0306 -0.121*** -0.160*** -0.0587*** -0.0399** 0.112*** 0.114*** -0.00557 -0.00778 
 (0.0300) (0.0282) (0.0331) (0.0389) (0.0221) (0.0162) (0.0264) (0.0249) (0.0306) (0.0405) 
50-64 0.0354 0.0260 -0.0107 -0.00379 -0.0682*** -0.0365** 0.0542*** 0.0357** -0.0395 -0.0518 
 (0.0287) (0.0261) (0.0338) (0.0406) (0.0195) (0.0151) (0.0204) (0.0146) (0.0268) (0.0353) 
+65 (REF)           
           
 
 
 
EDUCATION 
          
           
Primary -0.0786** -0.0479 -0.134*** -0.0736* -0.00177 -0.00749 0.144*** 0.0392 0.0625* 0.0630 
 (0.0366) (0.0372) (0.0351) (0.0428) (0.0193) (0.0141) (0.0336) (0.0293) (0.0344) (0.0471) 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 11(3) 2018: 646-691, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v11i3p646 
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Vocational -0.0768** -0.0596* -0.117*** -0.0679* -0.0145 -0.0110 0.0949*** 0.0165 0.113*** 0.118*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0305) (0.0329) (0.0382) (0.0166) (0.0128) (0.0251) (0.0227) (0.0308) (0.0409) 
Secondary -0.0548* -0.0449 -0.0352 0.0143 0.0201 0.00636 0.0363 0.000938 0.0296 0.0180 
 (0.0310) (0.0299) (0.0344) (0.0390) (0.0188) (0.0137) (0.0227) (0.0219) (0.0278) (0.0379) 
College (REF)           
           
INCOME           
           
N/A 0.00625 -0.00871 -0.0354 -0.0179 -0.0520** -0.0278* 0.00155 -0.0105 -0.0152 -0.0406 
 (0.0376) (0.0368) (0.0402) (0.0450) (0.0262) (0.0163) (0.0362) (0.0296) (0.0471) (0.0582) 
Q1 0.0702* 0.0338 -0.0212 0.00712 -0.0739*** -0.0382** 0.0583 0.0232 0.00360 0.0183 
 (0.0391) (0.0385) (0.0424) (0.0479) (0.0258) (0.0165) (0.0371) (0.0315) (0.0453) (0.0580) 
Q2 0.102*** 0.0543 -0.0302 0.000895 -0.0618** -0.0233 0.0645* 0.0528* -0.0410 -0.0453 
 (0.0361) (0.0359) (0.0366) (0.0413) (0.0244) (0.0165) (0.0341) (0.0315) (0.0409) (0.0527) 
Q3 0.0794** 0.0482 -0.0151 0.0195 -0.0389 0.00699 0.0272 -0.00552 -0.0116 -0.00975 
 (0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0378) (0.0431) (0.0258) (0.0201) (0.0346) (0.0282) (0.0435) (0.0554) 
Q4 0.0306 0.0117 0.0122 0.0555 -0.0125 0.00324 0.00679 -0.0129 -0.0303 -0.0349 
 (0.0317) (0.0318) (0.0343) (0.0397) (0.0244) (0.0168) (0.0324) (0.0268) (0.0408) (0.0522) 
Q5 (REF)           
           
EMPLOYMENT           
           
Not working 0.00463 0.0205 0.0373 0.0937* -0.0356 -0.0169 0.0614* 0.0125 -0.0535 -0.0933 
 (0.0409) (0.0370) (0.0471) (0.0552) (0.0294) (0.0185) (0.0339) (0.0284) (0.0469) (0.0609) 
Self-Employed -0.0619 0.0209 -0.0764* -0.0701 0.111*** 0.0529* 0.106** 0.0740* -0.0739 -0.0938 
 (0.0410) (0.0465) (0.0432) (0.0479) (0.0409) (0.0274) (0.0423) (0.0392) (0.0484) (0.0654) 
Intermediary 0.0221 0.0417 -0.0185 0.0196 -0.0586*** -0.0252* 0.105*** 0.0525* -0.0631 -0.107* 
 (0.0372) (0.0341) (0.0364) (0.0420) (0.0220) (0.0148) (0.0346) (0.0304) (0.0432) (0.0557) 
Routine non-manual 0.0386 0.0642* -0.0735** -0.0535 -0.0505** -0.0213 0.0957*** 0.0414 -0.0347 -0.0647 
 (0.0382) (0.0354) (0.0367) (0.0409) (0.0235) (0.0156) (0.0321) (0.0286) (0.0441) (0.0569) 
Manual worker 0.00516 0.00462 -0.0306 0.000639 -0.0559** -0.0138 0.0868** 0.0490 -0.0259 -0.0600 
 (0.0409) (0.0352) (0.0436) (0.0493) (0.0260) (0.0189) (0.0343) (0.0316) (0.0467) (0.0603) 
Manager (REF)           
           
 
 
 
RELIGION 
          
           
Practicing Catholic -0.185*** -0.102*** 0.00316 0.0213 0.262*** 0.129*** -0.0266 -0.0290 -0.0566 -0.0675 
 (0.0378) (0.0385) (0.0435) (0.0566) (0.0493) (0.0385) (0.0382) (0.0318) (0.0415) (0.0601) 
Occasional -0.163*** -0.0728** 0.0240 0.0145 0.120*** 0.0624*** 0.0579 0.0221 0.00939 0.00292 
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 (0.0324) (0.0338) (0.0359) (0.0432) (0.0281) (0.0205) (0.0354) (0.0302) (0.0373) (0.0495) 
No Practice -0.104*** -0.0280 0.0361 0.0293 0.0637*** 0.0308*** 0.0226 -0.00564 -0.00242 -0.0174 
 (0.0249) (0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0288) (0.0128) (0.00971) (0.0206) (0.0184) (0.0228) (0.0306) 
Other Faith 0.0146 0.0293 -0.0306 -0.0614 0.0412* 0.0136 -0.0975*** -0.0746*** 0.0830* 0.0843 
 (0.0434) (0.0414) (0.0362) (0.0409) (0.0239) (0.0157) (0.0222) (0.0207) (0.0424) (0.0540) 
No Religion (REF)           
           
SCALES           
           
Precariousness -0.0116 -0.0211* -0.0536*** -0.0421*** -0.0275*** -0.0108* 0.0200* -0.00177 0.0783*** 0.0882*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0120) (0.0133) (0.0157) (0.00777) (0.00575) (0.0103) (0.00866) (0.0118) (0.0155) 
Left-Right position  -0.122***  -0.00292  0.0580***  0.0755***  0.0137 
  (0.0118)  (0.0166)  (0.00811)  (0.0101)  (0.0163) 
Ethnocentrism  -0.0610***  -0.0356**  0.00568  0.0797***  -0.00845 
  (0.0124)  (0.0155)  (0.00533)  (0.00969)  (0.0161) 
Economic conservatism  -0.0793***  0.0569***  0.0359***  -0.00577  -0.00777 
  (0.0115)  (0.0136)  (0.00603)  (0.00852)  (0.0153) 
Cultural conservatism  -0.0164  -0.00219  0.00706  0.0118  0.0113 
  (0.0124)  (0.0156)  (0.00480)  (0.00774)  (0.0150) 
Anti-EU sentiment  0.00649  -0.131***  -0.0102**  0.0577***  0.0588*** 
  (0.0110)  (0.0155)  (0.00516)  (0.00835)  (0.0148) 
           
Observations 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Sig *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All scales are standardized (Mean=0, SD=
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Table B5b. Marginal effects of socio demographic and attitudinal variables on votes in 2nd round  
 
 Macron Le Pen No Vote 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
GENDER       
Women 0.106*** 0.123*** 0.00593 0.00561 -0.112*** -0.129*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0310) (0.0195) (0.0161) (0.0265) (0.0293) 
Men (REF)       
       
AGE       
18-24 -0.243*** -0.306*** 0.110*** 0.135*** 0.133** 0.171*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0555) (0.0381) (0.0377) (0.0519) (0.0561) 
25-34 -0.267*** -0.275*** 0.123*** 0.108*** 0.144*** 0.168*** 
 (0.0437) (0.0488) (0.0321) (0.0269) (0.0439) (0.0479) 
35-49 -0.200*** -0.236*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.0932** 0.130*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0437) (0.0264) (0.0229) (0.0378) (0.0422) 
50-64 -0.0798** -0.0768* 0.0723*** 0.0533*** 0.00755 0.0234 
 (0.0364) (0.0410) (0.0218) (0.0159) (0.0336) (0.0383) 
+65 (REF) 
 
      
EDUCATION       
Primary -0.161*** -0.000823 0.115*** 0.00751 0.0452 -0.00669 
 (0.0442) (0.0519) (0.0329) (0.0281) (0.0432) (0.0493) 
Vocational -0.120*** 0.0214 0.0904*** 0.00396 0.0298 -0.0254 
 (0.0387) (0.0440) (0.0260) (0.0237) (0.0369) (0.0418) 
Secondary -0.0527 0.0328 0.0373 -0.00637 0.0154 -0.0264 
 (0.0382) (0.0424) (0.0242) (0.0232) (0.0362) (0.0405) 
College(REF) 
 
      
INCOME       
N/A -0.0794 -0.0543 -0.000958 -0.00743 0.0803 0.0617 
 (0.0516) (0.0558) (0.0376) (0.0305) (0.0535) (0.0561) 
Q1 -0.0102 0.00879 0.0517 0.0290 -0.0415 -0.0378 
 (0.0521) (0.0570) (0.0381) (0.0324) (0.0510) (0.0553) 
Q2 0.0207 0.0518 0.0274 0.0164 -0.0481 -0.0682 
 (0.0468) (0.0516) (0.0336) (0.0289) (0.0465) (0.0504) 
Q3 0.0479 0.103* 0.0274 -0.00322 -0.0752 -0.0995* 
 (0.0486) (0.0540) (0.0356) (0.0288) (0.0479) (0.0521) 
Q4 0.0571 0.103** 0.0158 -0.00635 -0.0728* -0.0966** 
 (0.0442) (0.0488) (0.0336) (0.0274) (0.0442) (0.0478) 
Q5 (REF) 
 
      
EMPLOYMENT       
Not working -0.0597 0.0115 0.0829** 0.0327 -0.0232 -0.0442 
 (0.0544) (0.0599) (0.0342) (0.0269) (0.0519) (0.0572) 
Self-Employed -0.0420 -0.0169 0.103*** 0.0635* -0.0614 -0.0466 
 (0.0571) (0.0636) (0.0400) (0.0333) (0.0541) (0.0609) 
Intermediary -0.0702 -0.0106 0.0869*** 0.0471* -0.0167 -0.0365 
 (0.0467) (0.0514) (0.0320) (0.0260) (0.0460) (0.0500) 
Routine non-manual -0.139*** -0.0832 0.113*** 0.0664** 0.0258 0.0168 
Authors Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Title Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
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 (0.0471) (0.0517) (0.0312) (0.0265) (0.0469) (0.0509) 
Manual worker -0.0782 -0.0259 0.112*** 0.0774** -0.0339 -0.0515 
 (0.0529) (0.0583) (0.0343) (0.0305) (0.0505) (0.0556) 
Manager(REF) 
 
      
RELIGION       
Practicing Catholic 0.0898 0.128** 0.000287 -0.0233 -0.0901* -0.105* 
 (0.0583) (0.0654) (0.0407) (0.0287) (0.0539) (0.0613) 
Occasional -0.0212 0.00934 0.0493 0.0129 -0.0281 -0.0223 
 (0.0460) (0.0525) (0.0343) (0.0268) (0.0441) (0.0498) 
No Practice -0.0379 -0.0167 0.0586*** 0.0294 -0.0207 -0.0126 
 (0.0302) (0.0344) (0.0212) (0.0180) (0.0287) (0.0322) 
Other Faith 0.0924* 0.0639 -0.0804*** -0.0513** -0.0121 -0.0126 
 (0.0497) (0.0557) (0.0237) (0.0215) (0.0473) (0.0532) 
No religion (REF) 
 
      
SCALES       
Precariousness -0.121*** -0.0966*** 0.0191* -0.000148 0.102*** 0.0967*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0179) (0.0105) (0.00871) (0.0149) (0.0167) 
Left-Right position  -0.0498***  0.0537***  -0.00395 
  (0.0172)  (0.00843)  (0.0160) 
Ethnocentrism  -0.113***  0.0777***  0.0350** 
  (0.0179)  (0.00911)  (0.0170) 
Economic conservatism  0.0417***  -0.00943  -0.0323** 
  (0.0159)  (0.00839)  (0.0151) 
Cultural conservatism  0.00446  0.00515  -0.00962 
  (0.0173)  (0.00780)  (0.0161) 
Anti-EU sentiment  -0.189***  0.0743***  0.115*** 
  (0.0175)  (0.00828)  (0.0162) 
       
Observations 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 1,830 
Standard errors in parentheses. Sig *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All scales are standardized (Mean=0, SD=1). 
 
 
